Overstretched and Overrated?
Prospects of Regional Security Policy in Africa and its European Support

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin

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Foreword

◼ Regional organisations are playing an ever more important role in securing peace and security throughout the world. The United Nations, the European Union and Germany as well have all stressed the importance of strong regional organisations in various ways. In view of the large number of crises and violent conflicts and the challenges these pose to mediation and peacekeeping missions, the international community in particular supports the efforts of regional security communities in Africa to assume greater responsibility.

But do these regional organisations have the resources and capacities required to ensure peace and security in their regions? What is the status of the encouragingly progressive and exemplary – at least on paper – African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is being set up with the support of many actors? These are by no mean technical questions. Whoever seeks to answer them needs to have an understanding of and respect for the origins and developments of regional economic communities in Africa, and must not approach matters solely from the perspective of expectations of regional security communities articulated outside Africa.

This became particularly evident at the international conference »Overstretched and Overrated? Prospects of Regional Security Policy in Africa and its European Support«, which took place at the headquarters of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Berlin on 9 and 10 February 2011. Experts from Africa and Europe, decision-makers and representatives of various regional organisations had a very open exchange of views and opinions on the challenges and prospects of regional strategies for peace and security in Africa.

At the heart of the dialogue was and remains the debate over the definition and understanding of security and, based on these, requirements applying to regional security architectures and systems. The fact that the focus of security policy is increasingly being placed on people and the concept of human security can be attributed to the agreements, treaties and accords of the APSA, but must also be reflected in strategies of regional cooperation and integration. The task is of course to continue to strengthen regional instruments and mechanisms of mediation and conflict management. But security is also inextricably related to economic and social development. These original aims of regional integration in Africa must not be lost sight of.

Against this background and within the framework of its work fostering and promoting democracy and development, the FES is making a commitment towards comprehensive, democratic security policy and deeper regional cooperation with its 19 offices in sub-Saharan Africa, its three regional security policy projects and its AU liaison office. In its capacity as a German and European organisation, the FES is by the same token also especially seeking to intensify the European-African dialogue on security-policy challenges and shape European support for African security communities. It is in this connection that the Berlin conference constitutes a milestone in the security policy work of the FES in Africa. A special thanks goes out to all the participants for their committed contributions along with all of the colleagues in the broader FES network involved in the organisation of this international conference. The discussion laying the foundations, as it were, was only possible thanks to mutually agreed-upon confidentiality, which is why it was decided to not keep any detailed minutes of the discussion. It was intended to make the basic arguments available in the form of this documentation, however, in order to stimulate and enrich further discussion over the promotion of peace and security in Africa.

■ Information: The African Peace and Security Architecture Framework for Promoting Peace and Security in Africa

Introduction

With the transformation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), the first regular session of the AU Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa in 2002 adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol). This protocol came into force in January 2004 following its ratification by simple majority of member states of the AU. Through this protocol, the AU is endowed with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, which has come to be known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), of which regional economic communities (RECs) are a part. One key element of the APSA is the creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was launched in May 2004. A new policy organ superseding the Central Organ of the 1993 OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, the PSC was created to coordinate peace-building efforts on the continent.

According to Article 2 of the Protocol, the PSC is ›a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts‹ which operates as ›a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.‹ The mandate of the PSC as stipulated under Article 7 includes:

- anticipating and preventing disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;
- undertaking peace-making and performing a peace-building function in order to resolve conflicts where they occur; authorising the initiation and deployment of peace support missions;
- recommending to the assembly intervention in a member state in the event of grave circumstances as provided for in Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act; and
- supporting and facilitating humanitarian action in situations involving armed conflicts or major natural disasters.

Article 2 of the PSC Protocol lays down the components of the APSA that support the work of the PSC. These are the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund.

The Peace Fund and the EU Peace Facility

A special fund or peace fund has been created to provide the necessary financial resources for peace and security operations and other operational activities.[1] Contributions to this include funds from the AU's regular budget (contributions from member states), voluntary contributions from member states and other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals and also the international community. While international partners and other parties have tended to fulfil their commitments to this fund, getting member states to live up to their commitments remains a challenge, and most of them are in arrears on their contributions. For its part the European Union has established a facility for its contribution. The African Peace Facility (APF) was established by the EU in 2004 as a response to a request by African leaders at the AU Summit in Maputo (2003) for contributions to the African peace and security agenda through targeted support at the continental and regional levels in the areas of conflict-prevention, management and resolution, and peace building. The APF is linked to the AU-EU joint strategy and seeks to address peace and security priorities jointly defined in the Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).

ASF and RECs

Through the creation of this ASF, the AU is furthermore mandated to co-ordinate the activities of Africa's sub-regional mechanisms. The force would comprise of five brigades from each of Africa's sub-regions: i.e. the Southern African Development Community's Standby Force (SSF); the Central African Economic and Monetary Community Standby Force (CSF); the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF); and the Northern Africa Standby Brigade (NORTHBRIG). Because the composition of the bri-

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1 Article 21 of the PSC Protocol

gades does not necessarily correspond to RECs, each brigade has a separate Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the AU. In addition to this, a MoU on cooperation in the areas of peace and security was adopted by the AU and the RECs/REMs in January 2008 to define modalities of coordination and communication in the operationalisation of APSA with all the RECs. The ASF would eventually be linked to the UN's stand-by arrangements.

In addition to the ASF, the broader APSA also creates a Military Staff Committee and Regional Mechanisms (RM) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as additional components providing advice on deployment and security requirements. The military staff committee is composed of senior military officers of the member states of the PSC, tasked to advise and assist the PSC in all military and security questions.

The Continental Early Warning System
The AU's Peace and Security Protocol also establishes a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Established under Article 12 (1) of the PSC Protocol, CEWS was introduced as a concept of early response assigning great importance to the need for early detection of conflicts. The system is composed of:

- an observation and monitoring centre located at the AU, to be known as ›The Situation Room‹;
- Observation and Monitoring Units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room. These units are to collect and process data at the regional level and transmit it to the Situation Room.

The Panel of the Wise
The Panel of the Wise is another peacemaking component of APSA. Established under Article 11 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, it provides advice to the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa; it also undertakes action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of conflict whenever necessary in the form it deems most appropriate. The Panel decides itself

whether issues involve the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The protocol goes on to set out the entry points, determines the modalities for action and identifies the institutional arms that would support the PSC in the fulfilment of its primary responsibility for conflict prevention in Africa.[2]

The Commission Chairperson and Other Organs
Equally significant is the role of the chairperson of the AU commission who is allowed to bring to the attention of the PSC any matter deemed to constitute a threat to the internal peace and stability of a member state. The chairperson is also authorised to ›take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts‹, through his or her good offices.[3]

To complement the work of the peace and security structures of the AU, a Pan-African Parliament was established in March 2004, with its base in South Africa, for parliamentarians across the continent.[4] The AU has also established an Economic, Social and Cultural Council to involve the views and ideas of civil society in the affairs of the Union. It has adopted a declaration of gender equality, which is necessary in order to promote the partnership between men and women in resolving conflicts on the continent.[5]

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2 Article 11 (3) and (4)
3 Article 10 (1) Protocol PSC
4 Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, »The Pan-African Parliament: A Plenary of Parliamentarians«, African Security Review, 13 (4), 2004.
5 AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality, Assembly of Heads of State, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6-8 July 2004, AU/Decl.12 (III).

Dr. Gernot Erler

Deputy Chairperson of
the SPD Parliamentary
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former State Minister

»External dangers have also become more complex, requiring a coordinated approach at the regional, continental and global levels.«

■ I am pleased to open a conference addressing one of the most important questions concerning the future of the African continent. I am all the more pleased because this conference is not solely concentrating on the problem of security deficits, but is rather especially looking for solutions to the problem, much in contrast to common one-sided depictions of Africa as a »trouble spot«, and seeking to engage participants in a constructive discussion of ways to improve the situation. In the next few days you will be analysing the African security architecture and discussing successes and failures as well as the possibilities and constraints at work here at present.

This conference is taking place at a time at which the security architecture is being sorely put to the test once more. Following long years of political instability and elections which were actually supposed to mean a turning point, Côte d'Ivoire is once again facing a situation in which two presidents with two governments and two armies have pushed the country to the brink of another civil war. Once an economic success, Côte d'Ivoire is teetering at the precipice of total collapse. The possible repercussions for the region cannot be conjectured.

This case at the same time offers a stellar example of one stubborn problem: development successes are squandered or countries do not ramp into development in the first place because crises and conflicts cancel out any progress which has been made. Crises

and particularly wars are always tantamount to a halt in needed reform, exodus of the intellectual elite, the flight of investors and decay of the infrastructure instead of its badly needed improvement. No matter who wins an armed conflict, the country on whose soil it is waged always loses. Without peace and democracy, economic and social progress is inconceivable.

In the decades following the independence of African states from the earlier colonial powers, the continent experienced many wars, armed conflicts and political upheavals. Africa was also one of the regions in which proxy wars were carried out by the industrialised world during the Cold War, leaving Africa in the cross-fire of superpower politics. The many armed conflicts have prevented Africa from assuming a role in the world commensurate with its wealth in human resources, natural resources and culture.

War and poverty have unfortunately become a stereotype of Africa in Europe. But very few people are aware that the number of wars has declined steadily over the last decade while the scale of violent conflicts on the continent has also abated.

Nevertheless Africa continues to face major challenges on the path to sustainable peace and democracy. The dangers and hazards have changed considerably over the last few decades. Instead of wars between countries, it is internal conflicts which have come to the fore – fed by organised crime, terrorism and the privatisation of force. Social tensions, the growing divide between rich and poor and the distressing lack of alternatives for young people offer ideal breeding ground for extremist ideologies. Add the flourishing trade in small arms and one has the perfect recipe for violence.

This is facing the continent with new and complex challenges. Internal domestic security is not only a matter of training military and security forces. Security policy affects many aspects of governance in all fields of policy and for this reason can only be successful if a large part of the population is included in the political process. Only a democratically

organised, comprehensive security policy can meet the complex requirements of a democratically constituted society.

But external dangers have also become more complex, requiring a coordinated approach at the regional, continental and global levels. Cross-border crime ranging from arms to drug trafficking is challenging the state. Wherever cross-border criminal structures establish themselves, it is virtually impossible for individual national states to deal with these alone. And anyone seeking to smuggle drugs, run weapons or traffic humans across Africa has no interest in stable states and will doggedly work to destabilise them. This poses a challenge which states can only tackle collectively and by cooperating with each other. This is where in particular regional security structures come into the equation.

Europe is the direct neighbour of Africa and cannot just look away when the security of human beings is at stake. Africa's security problems are also related to Europe's security problems. That is why the incessant call of development sceptics to leave Africa to itself is not only populist, but also short-sighted. The recent kidnappings of French nationals in Central Sahara, ships captured by pirates in waters off the African coast and a flood of refugees enduring indescribable horrors and tribulations to reach Europe because they no longer see any hope or prospects in their own

countries – we do not want to look away and ignore what is happening to our neighbours. And we are also aware of our responsibility for Africa's challenges. It is for these reasons that we want to work together with African actors to develop sustainable solutions and support them in their implementation.

This means not only participation in UN peacekeeping missions on the continent, but above all support in the establishment of Africa's own conflict-resolution mechanisms. Africa can hope for a peaceful future if it continues to move forward along the path it has taken to establish an African security architecture. The African Union and regional economic communities have spelt out clear democratic standards and codes of practice. The task at hand now is to support these structures and demand that these standards and codes be put into practice.

African states must make it clear more than they have in the past that they will not tolerate oppression of peoples or abuse of human rights. The African community must be strong enough to raise its voice in objection early on when rulers do not accept democratic elections or their results. The capacities with which to respond to these crises must be strengthened through the AU and the economic communities.

This does not mean that Europe is trying to shun its responsibility. On the contrary, we want to continue

to work for democracy and peace with Africa in a partnership-like manner.

The EU has for this reason also rightly made peace and security one of eight partnerships in which both continents are working together more intensely within the framework of the joint Africa-EU strategy. This partnership involves both a dialogue on challenges to peace and security as well as support for peace and security operations under African command. The comprehensive African peace and security architecture plays a key role here. The EU is supporting the development of this architecture financially and structurally.

As a member of the EU, Germany is of course involved in these efforts, but it also has its own cooperative relationships. Here the focus of German foreign policy initiatives is on the prevention of crises and conflicts, especially through cooperation with civil structures. In our view, the democratisation of security policy is a key task.

The regional organisations serve as the foundation for African security policy. These have developed along different trajectories and have already had to mediate in crisis and conflicts several times in the past. Whether it be in Guinea, Somalia or Zimbabwe, regional organisations have always been involved in solving the conflict, although producing a different result in each instance, as will be shown in the case studies later. At this conference, then, the task will be to take a critical look at what regional organisations can do, where they have been successful, and where they need to get better.

Because the hopes of the continent for peace and stability rest on these regional organisations, this analysis must be a critical one. By the same token, it must not proceed under unrealistic expectations. Europe's experience shows the difficult processes through which states have to go to work together and cooperate in the area of security and to give up sovereign power.

By cooperating in this area we can hence learn much from one another. It is in this spirit that I wish all of us a conference which is full of exciting discussions and which produces interesting findings.

- The spoken word applies. -

It gives me great pleasure to be back in Berlin, at the invitation of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, to participate in this international conference »Overstretched and Overrated: Prospects of Regional Security Policy in Africa and its European Support«. I think the basic question the conference is expected to address is whether the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as mandated by the Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) adopted in Serte Libya in February 2004 is overstretched or overrated. Perhaps I should mention from the outset that the CADSP identifies the common security threats to the continent; the principles and values underlining the CADSP; the objectives and goals of such policy as well as its implementing organs and mechanisms, and the building blocks of the CADSP. In this context, APSA provides a framework for the implementation of the CADSP. I should like to state from the outset that it is neither overstretched nor overrated.

There is therefore no doubt that Berlin provides an excellent venue for serious reflection on EuropeAfrica relations and what support Africa expects from Europe in a continental drive to strengthen its collective security mechanisms and frameworks. Lest we forget, the Berlin conference has placed Africa in a very complex peace and security landscape and I think Europe and Africa have a joint responsibility to address the mistakes of history – not to apportion blame, but to seriously exchange views on how best Europe can support Africa in the implementation of the CADSP and APSA.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been requested by the conference organizers to provide insight into the status quo, potential and prospects for the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in conflict and crisis management. Within this context, I am expected to also discuss possible future responsibilities of Germany and European Foreign Policy in their support of APSA. I should like to state before going into the topic that the development, sustenance, efficiency and efficacy of both the CADSP and APSA is first and foremost the responsibility of the African people, their governments and their

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African Problems and their African Solutions – Is the African Peace and Security Architecture Suited to Address Current Security Threats in Africa?

institutions. No non-African institutions can claim to have the system of values and ideals that drive the aspirations and demands of the African people for peace, security, stability and development. But, given our history, we would expect Europe to support Africa in the implementation of its peace, security and stability agenda as a prerequisite for social and economic development.

Let me state categorically that Africa is not aversive to advice, technical support or even partnership. But the responsibility to design and implement policies lies squarely with the African people and African governments. Against this background and understanding, I should therefore like first to provide an overview of the evolution of Africa's peace and security agenda and then discuss the specific role of the RECs and, finally, express my views on what I consider to be the role of Europe and European Foreign Policies in support of APSA.

It is significant that, with the establishment of the AU, African leaders have continued to grapple with the implementation of Africa's peace and security agenda. Indeed, African leaders have aggressively sought to strengthen their regional security structures while simultaneously attempting to democratize. As former President of the Republic of Mozambique, I recognize that there is a greater realization on the part of African leaders that the democratization process often leads to contested elections and that, rather than

becoming the panacea for peace and stability, elections have increasingly become a major root cause of contemporary conflict in Africa. Cleary, the challenges posed by on-going democratization efforts have had a visible impact on the effectiveness of both the CADSP and APSA.

[...]

As part of the CADSP and subsequently the APSA evolution process and within the framework of creating a new peace and security architecture, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU endorsed the establishment of the central organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in July 2001. The Mechanism was envisaged to be the operational arm of the planned Peace and Security Council of the AU.

Consequently, at the first session of the Assembly of the AU on 9 July 2002, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was established as the policy-making organ responsible for the peace and security of the member states of the AU. The Protocol which established the PSC of the AU (hereafter the Protocol) came into force on 26 December 2003 after having been ratified by the requisite 27 member states. It is significant that the Protocol conceived the PSC as »a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa« with the support of the African Union Commission and its Peace and Security Department.

Obviously, the PSC would not be able to discharge its peace and security responsibility without an established system of information-gathering that would inform the decision-making process of the PSC. To this end, the African leaders also decided to create the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as an information-gathering tool to provide early information on potential conflicts before they actually occur. It is one thing to be able to anticipate conflicts. It is completely another to intervene in conflicts, especially when they call for the use of force.

Against this background, the African leaders decided to establish an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee (MSC) with the specific task of advising and assisting in all issues related to military deployment. Two other structures were also established, namely the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. It is important to recognize that the RECs were assigned similar peace and security responsibility at the sub-regional level.

The performance of the peace and security structure both at regional and sub-regional level has been mixed. However, what is clear is that with the establishment of the AU in July 2002, and the subsequent creation of the PSC, EWS and the ASF, African leaders have made impressive progress towards the creation of an African security regime as part of collective security predicated upon the imperatives of African Unity, Responsibility to Protect and Try-Africa-First. As former President of the Republic of Mozambique and someone who has participated in the debates and decisions to work towards APSA, I feel very encouraged and take pride and honour in having contributed to the development of a new peace and security regime in Africa.

I should like at this juncture to focus my views on the role of the RECs in the promotion and implementation of Africa's peace and security agenda. In doing so, I should like to focus specifically on the concept of collective security and regional economic integration as defined by APSA. I should like to suggest that Africa has a long history of regional economic cooperation and integration. Efforts taken towards regional integration are noticeable in the post-independent period, with the intensification of the continent's regional integration and cooperation process. Clearly, the basic objective of APSA, whether at the regional

or sub-regional level, is driven by the desire to promote peace and security as a necessary condition for social and economic advancement within the framework of African Unity, Responsibility to Protect and Try-Africa-First.

[...]

I should like to point out that the SADC, ECOWAS and ECCAS have established their presence and are well known both on and outside the continent, while UMA is less known. However, the League of Arab States or Arab League, which has members from both Africa and the Arab world, has been able to establish a strong presence in North Africa and the Middle East and is well known on the continent. In fact, the Arab League, SADC and ECOWAS have been able to establish their presence in both their respective sub-regions and in the region. This is essentially because of their involvement in various mediation processes in their respective sub-regions. In my view, there is no doubt that both the SADC and ECOWAS meet the requirements of an REC as provided for in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos adopted in 1980.

[...]

I should like to reiterate that over the last two decades the continent has experienced a proliferation of sub-regional economic integration and cooperation entities with overlapping mandates. As a result,

there are a number of countries within the continent which belong to more than one sub-regional organization. Available information indicates that among the major regions of the world, Africa has the highest concentration of economic integration and cooperation arrangements. I am of the view that the proliferation of sub-regional entities is not necessarily a bad thing. It is clear, however, that the overlapping mandates create confusion and make harmonization imperative if Africa wants the RECs to perform at optimal levels. We therefore need to accelerate the process of harmonization of RECs in order to avoid duplication of mandates and to make better use of available resources, both human and financial.

I am happy to note that the leadership on the continent is now working on a programme of harmonization of the RECs. Progress has been somewhat slow, however. I should like to strongly recommend that the process of harmonizing the RECs be accelerated. At the same time, I am convinced that African leaders are determined to harmonize and strengthen the RECs, particularly because Africa wants the RECs to assume a more robust role in conflict prevention, management and resolution as provided for in the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos. Obviously the RECs cannot realize their mandate for regional economic cooperation and integration in the absence of peace, security and stability in the African region.

[...]

Allow me to share with you my views on whether APSA is suited to address current security threats in Africa. In doing so, I should like to first of all provide basic information on the evolution of Africa's peace and security agenda and the development of APSA within the framework of a broader agenda for regional economic cooperation and integration. I should like to point out, as I have done before, that APSA is inspired by the ideals of the founding leaders of the OAU and its successor, the AU. APSA is therefore predicated upon the concept of regional collective security guided by three core basic principles, namely African Unity, Responsibility to Protect and Try-Africa-First. The last principle is within the broader concept of an African solution to African problems. In this context it is important to emphasise the historical evolution of these concepts and the determination of African leaders to promote peace, security and stability in Africa as a prerequisite for sustainable economic development in Africa.

Consequently, I should like to submit that there is no doubt in my mind that the RECs were conceived as the building blocks for APSA. By and large, APSA remains a tool of, and provides a framework for, the implementation of the CADSP. We all know

that the post-independence period has witnessed the proliferation of sub-regional groups along with the deepening and broadening of Africa's integration process at both continental and sub-regional levels. I should like to suggest to this conference that the overall objective has been to promote peace, security and stability in Africa as a precondition for social and economic advancement of the region. In my view, this is part of the realization on the part of the African leadership that there cannot be development without peace, and that peace without development is often illusive.

[...]

I should therefore like to recommend that APSA recognize the important role of the RECs in security management and conflict transformation. There is no doubt that APSA's security mandate cannot be fulfilled without strong collaboration between, and close working relations with, the RECs. Significantly, the Protocol acknowledges the contribution of African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent and the need to establish formal coordination and cooperation ar-

rangements between these Regional Mechanisms and the African Union.

At this juncture, I must point out that Article 16 of the Protocol outlines the relationship between the PSC with the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The article also outlines the type of relationships expected between the African Union Commission and the RECs. In my view, this article recognizes the imperative role of the RECs in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. It falls short of explaining the operational modalities, however, and the kind of support the RECs would expect from the PSC of the AU Commission.

Instead, the article merely states that the Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the AU, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. Additionally, the Protocol also states that the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission shall harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the AU. The article also calls on the Chairperson of the AU Commission to work closely with Regional Mechanisms to ensure effective partnership between them and the PSC in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. It is envisaged that the modalities of such a partnership would be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances.

Under the Protocol, the PSC in consultation with Regional Mechanisms is expected to promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts. It is also expected to perform peace-making and peace-building functions in circumstances where conflicts have occurred. In undertaking these efforts, the Regional Mechanisms concerned are expected to keep the PSC fully and continuously informed of their activities through the Chairperson of the AU Commission. They must also ensure that such activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of the PSC.

Similarly, the PSC is expected to also keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities through the Chairperson of the AU Commission. In order to ensure close harmonization

and coordination, the PSC and the RECs are expected to regularly exchange information. To this end, the Chairperson is required to convene periodic meetings, at least once a year, with the Chief Executives and/or the officials in charge of peace and security within the Regional Mechanisms.

Additionally, the Chairperson of the Commission is required to take the necessary measures wherever appropriate to ensure the full involvement of Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. Moreover, the Protocol calls for Regional Mechanisms to be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the PSC whenever this question is being addressed by a Regional Mechanism or is of special interest to that Or-

ganization. Similarly, the Chairperson of the AU Commission is also expected to be invited to participate in meetings and deliberations of Regional Mechanisms. In order to strengthen coordination and cooperation, the AU Commission is mandated to establish liaison offices to the Regional Mechanisms. Equally, the Regional Mechanisms are encouraged to establish liaison offices to the Commission.

[...]

Consequently, in responding to the basic question raised by the conference I should like to categorically state that I have no doubt that APSA is indeed suited to deal with Africa's security threats. In my view the security threats range from weak institutions of democracy and governance structure, poverty and inequality, ethnicity, the prevalence of armed conflicts, the scourge of landmines, trafficking of small arms, sea piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, food security, climate change, depletion of water resources, religious fundamentalism, xenophobia, unequal natural resource endowment, corruption, unconstitutional changes of government, contested elections, social and economic marginalization and other root causes of conflicts. I think that in Africa one of the major security threats is poverty and inequality within and between nations. This is essentially why the regional integration and cooperation agenda has increasingly become the foundation for the peace and security agenda in Africa.

[...]

Judging from the African leaders' determination and commitment to promoting peace, security and stability in Africa on the basis of regional integration and cooperation, I am absolutely convinced of the strategic viability of APSA. I therefore do not necessarily agree that APSA is overstretched and overrated. I think the prospects for the success of the CADSP and, in an extended sense, APSA, are enormous. Having said that, I must also add that success will very much depend on regular and timely replenishment of the African Peace Facility and a strong partnership between the European Union and the countries of Europe through a foreign policy that regards Africa as a strategic partner in the promotion and sustenance of global peace and security within the framework of multilateralism.

Let me make some final remarks on the prospects for regional security policy in Africa and its European support. I should like to base my remarks on the Cairo Declaration on the African–Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the European Union held in Cairo, Egypt from 3 to 4 April 2000. In particular, I should like to focus on section five, in which the question of cooperation in peace-building, conflict-prevention, management and resolution was addressed. The Cairo Declaration states that »We, the Heads of State and Government of African States and of the European Union as well as the President of the European Commission, have met in the First Africa–Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and EU in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, acknowledge that the parties concerned bear the primary responsibility for preventing, managing and resolving internal armed conflicts«.

While reaffirming that the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Cairo Summit commended and fully supported the efforts that were being made by the OAU, including those aimed at strengthening its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, to promote and sustain peace, security and stability in Africa.

[...]

It is significant that the Cairo Summit addressed the issue of post-conflict assistance and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The leaders of Europe and Africa agreed that the main objective in post-conflict situations must be to help countries in crisis to end their dependency on emergency aid and return to a path of development. The Summit acknowledged the need in post-conflict situations for urgent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, in particular child soldiers. Additionally, the Summit recognized that problems such as environmental consequences of conflicts must be addressed in a comprehensive integrated framework.

The European partners pleaded for continued collaboration in developing and providing their financial support for programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and in particular

to provide vocational training to former and demobilized combatants. This could be associated with the development of programmes for the effective management and the eventual destruction of accumulated small arms and light weapons. The Cairo Summit reaffirmed its unreserved condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, wherever and whenever it occurs, whatever its motives and origin, its opposition to making concessions to terrorist demands, and its determination to prevent those committing terrorist crimes from deriving any benefit whatsoever from their acts.

The Cairo Summit welcomed the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the 35th OAU Summit held in Algiers in July 1999. Regarding small arms and light weapons, the Summit expressed its deep concern about the huge influx of arms and military equipment to conflict areas. To this end, the Summit acknowledged that the illicit, excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons poses a threat to peace and security on the African continent. The Summit is committed to addressing the problem of small arms in Africa,

taking into account the supply side, and destroying stocks of such arms and weapons. In this regard, the Summit pledged to fully co-operate at international forums, to combat the problem of illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Summit also welcomed the initiatives taken at the regional level, in particular, the ECOWAS moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in its sub-region, similar SADC and East African initiatives as well as setting up an EUSADC joint working group on small arms. The Summit also expressed its deep concern over the problem of landmines and renewed its commitment to resolving it.

The Cairo Summit stressed the need for intensifying efforts in the fields of mine clearance, assistance in this and with respect to mine victims and mine awareness and pledged to continue co-operating in finding a comprehensive resolution to the landmine problem in Africa, in particular by addressing the issue of the removal of existing landmines. The Summit called on those states in a position to do so, in particular states involved in the deployment of mines, to provide the necessary technical and fi-

nancial assistance for landmine clearance operations and rehabilitation of victims.

The Cairo Summit noted with great concern the persistence of numerous conflicts in Africa, of which a great number continue to cause loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and property. These conflicts threaten peace, stability, regional and international security and hinder the aspirations of the African people to peace, prosperity and development, in particular in Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Western Sahara. In this regard, the Summit reaffirmed its determination to support the rapid and equitable implementation of the peace plans and settlement plans adopted by the UN and/or the OAU as well as the efforts of the UN and the OAU with a view to finding peaceful and durable solutions to all conflicts in accordance with principles of international law, the UN Charter and, where appropriate, relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and the OAU Charter.

In conclusion, I should like to suggest that the main problem facing APSA, and indeed the overall CADSP, is for the most part technical rather than political. Africa is on the right path in its quest for the best African Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and in addressing various security threats in Africa. In fact, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution is already in place, as is APSA. The challenge, however, lies in the operationalization of certain components, including the African Standby Force. Once fully operational, APSA will be able to face the challenges of the 21st century, particularly in addressing security threats, some of which were enumerated in the Cairo Declaration. It is often said that the 20th century was a lost century for Africa, and the continent cannot afford to miss time and again the opportunity to take off, with progress, prosperity and development, premised on sustainable peace and stability, with a constructive support of its partners. Africa cannot but make APSA work and the African people are counting on the support of the European Union and the European donor community in making this happen.

- The spoken word applies. -

Mr. President, in your presentation you stressed the importance of economic development and integration as the basis for any progress in the African security architecture. Would you therefore say »economy first« and not »security first« or »democracy first«?

No, neither should be prioritised. Everything is related to everything else. I am issuing a plea for a comprehensive approach to these development problems. Economic growth and democratisation go hand in hand. An economy will only grow steadily, quickly and in a sustainable manner if this is accompanied by processes of democratisation. Vice versa, it is not possible to achieve democratisation with an empty stomach – without a roof over one's head or access to clean water, it will be difficult. Otherwise a population will not support a political process of reform with elections or formation of political parties. Economic development is a must. Peace, democracy and development together form a single coin: each coin has two sides and one edge. Each of these three elements is needed.

Would you say that African states and/or Western donors have the wrong priorities in this respect?

Indeed, things have not always been assigned the right weight. The Western world has all too often vehemently raised its voice and instructed African states that they must first establish democratic structures and that development aid resources will then flow. In other words, they prioritised one element of this coin and ignored the other factors involved. Let's take the example of Mozambique: the Western world called upon us to institute political reforms shortly after independence and made aid contingent upon this, but we were completely dependent on transfer payments at that point in time. 76 to 78 per cent the population were living in abject poverty. Illiteracy was at a similar level. Under conditions like this, it is not possible to impose a democratic system based on Western standards in a country. This development must take place organically in order to be sustainable. Only economic progress creates latitude in the minds of people. The population will no doubt articulate their desires, the cry for democratisation will automatically become louder. It is rarely that part of the population living in isolated, rural areas, and more those who are connected with the rest of the world through education and economic links who receive ideas from the rest of the world and react to these. These people will organise and will think in more abstract terms about the social and political structure. They will weigh out alternatives and call for decisions. The requirements attached by donors were thus unrealistic because they set the wrong priorities.

How about the African side?

On the African side it was less a question of wrong priorities, and instead more the lack of understanding of alternatives. In many cases a country achieved independence under the tutelage of the former colonial power. Take the example of the Commonwealth and the Lancaster House Agreement: in accords like this, constitutional principles, but also a world view are posited. The principle of majority rule was introduced, but multi-party systems did not become established and one party quickly became dominant because it was considered to be necessary for development to have a strong centre tying together the complexity of young African states, their many ethnic groups, religions and languages. European states in their much longer histories have had similar experiences: fragile societies frequently developed into centralised, even dictatorial regimes such as, for example, in Portugal, Spain and Germany. There have been similar processes in Africa, a similar demand for strong central power. Tanzania also developed from a multi-party to a single-party system. Nobody criticises Tanzania for this. It was considered to be necessary for unity and the development of the country and its people. We have gone through similar processes in Mozambique. We have placed a clear priority on education in order to stimulate change.

What pragmatic steps would you propose to the APSA, the African Peace and security architecture, for the near future?

Well, I am now a former head of state and as such should not interfere in the everyday politics of my

former colleagues and successors. I myself also of course only have a limited ability to assess the situation, as I know too little about the internal discussions. But what I would definitely like to see is movement, movement forward. Dynamics and harmony, that's what I would like to see. I have found, however, that things are moving in the right direction. Efforts are at any rate being made. It is important, however, that the APSA is not seen as something abstract. It must be instilled with life; it must bring about a perceptible change in the lives of people and be further developed on a broad front to meet their needs. The definitions of peace and security are both multifaceted. The APSA must not wait for the next conflict

to prove its meddle. It must make the right moves ahead of time and its elements must harmonise with each other. The APSA must also work resolutely on the integration of African states in order to prevent wars between nations and civil wars.

In your presentation you identified the Stand-By Force as one of the biggest challenges of the African union. What do you mean by this specifically?

Basically this involves a technical problem. The resources are simply lacking. I can still remember very well when we wanted to send troops to Burundi. We had tremendous problems transporting the troops there. Mozambique had made the troops available, but only had very limited, almost non-existent, logistical capabilities. So we negotiated with the European Union, but the negotiations got more and more bogged down in red tape. It was so bureaucratic that we finally had to turn to South Africa, even though the EU had already agreed to support us. With this rapid help from South Africa we were able to bridge the time until the European Union was able to support us – I think the South Africans were never provided compensation, as had actually been agreed upon. But it doesn't matter because it was good that there was a transitional African solution.

The Stand-By Force simply require more support to be made rapidly available so that they can be deployed effectively. Of course we Africans will achieve the maximum possible on our continent, but even then we still lack resources. When I think back on all of the agreements, pledges and promises made by the Western world, for example at the summit meeting in Cairo, there is actually no problem on paper, but things are simply much different in actual practice. Europe likes to monitor things and make lots of recommendations, but concrete support would often be more helpful.

Conducted on 9 February 2011 at FES Berlin
by Julian Junk

The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict and Political Crisis

Summaries of the studies evaluating the crisis responses of IGAD (in Somalia), ECOWAS (in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau) and SADC (in Madagascar, Zimbabwe)

»The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict. The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau«
Author: Gilles Olakounlé Yabi

The study reviews the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the conflicts in the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the Republic of Guinea.

Guinea-Bissau's political history after its independence has been characterised by a blatant weakness of the state with a continuous succession of violent conflicts, plots, suspicion of plots, coup attempts and preventive elimination of opponents. In the years 1997–1998 the country was shattered by a civil war. Severe internal tensions developed again from 2004 on, especially around the election times in 2005 and 2008, culminating in several assassinations of political leaders. The political history of Guinea has been no less turbulent. After being ruled by two strong and repressive regimes between 1958 and 2008, internal and violent conflicts mounted from 2005 on, especially when there was a succession of government, culminating in a military putsch in 2008.

»To prevent the resurgence of violent conflicts in such a context is a Herculean challenge for any organization«, the author points out clearly. Nevertheless, ECOWAS started various initiatives aimed at stabilizing both countries – in Guinea-Bissau from 2005–2010 and in Guinea from 2007–2010 – and implementing the values and political princi-

ples laid down in the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted in 1999, and complemented by the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001. The author shows in detail how ECOWAS always publicly defended the principles of democracy and good governance both in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and put pressure on illegitimate regimes, how ECOWAS launched numerous mediation and advisory missions, sent election observers, facilitated security sector reforms and tried to arouse the attention of the international community – regrettably always constrained by very limited financial and human resources. The study points out that all these efforts were only partially successful: They were often aimed at achieving a temporary easing of tensions, and to some extent prevented the elites from acting too illegitimately, but failed to tackle the root causes of lasting insecurity, structural instability and underdevelopment in both countries, which lay first of all in the lack of responsibility on the part of the local political leaders.

»The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict. The Cases in Madagascar and Zimbabwe«
Author: Gavin Cawthra

The study examines how the South African Development Community (SADC) reacted to the political crisis in two of its member states, Madagascar and Zimbabwe, on the basis of the political agreements of 2001 and 2004, which have assigned SADC the

task of preventing intra- and interstate conflicts and promoting democracy and human rights.

The Madagascar crisis more or less took place in 2009, when President Marc Ravalomanana was driven out of power by Andry Rajoelina with the help of the armed forces. SADC, more than other international organizations, reacted resolutely to this unconstitutional change of power, condemning it publicly, suspending the country's membership in SADC and even threatening Madagascar with sanctions. SADC then toned down its approach, launching mediation missions, which lead to an agreement for a transitional government. Rajoelina, however, has recently broken the agreement, leaving Madagascar in a situation of ongoing crisis.

The Zimbabwe crisis can be traced back to the »Movement for Democratic Change« in 2000, formed in opposition to the rule of ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe. In response, Mugabe and ZANU-PF stepped up the repression and violence against the opposition and launched a »land distribution programme« which proved to be ruinous to the country's economy. SADC was much more reluctant to intervene in Zimbabwe than in Madagascar, agreeing publicly with Mugabe that the crisis was mainly caused by land reform and Western sanctions. In contrast to the case with Madagascar, it remained publicly silent on issues of human rights and refrained from any criticism of unfair electoral processes. Still, SADC's mediation efforts helped to bring about an inclusive government involving the opposition, at least postponing the final clash between both conflict parties.

The study concludes that the differences between SADC's approach to the Madagascar and Zimbabwe crisis may be put down to two factors: first the fact that the economies of several SADC countries are intertwined with those in Zimbabwe, but not Madagascar; secondly the fact that SADC tends to support incumbents in power as well as the presidents and states act in mutual support of each other. According to the author, SADC is ultimately a weak organization, lacking institutional, conceptual and mobilizing capacities, working by consensus, dependent on the political will of its member states and scarcely able to deal with the root causes of the recurrent crisis in its member states.

»The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD«
Author: Kidist Mulugeta Kebede

The study primarily examines the role of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving the prolonged Somali conflict, which has been plaguing the country and its neighbours for two decades.

IGAD (until 1996 IGADD) has been involved in So-malia since 1991. From 1991 to 2002 IGAD was involved in restoring peace and stability in Somalia by endorsing the initiatives taken by member states or by mandating member states to head initiatives on Somalia. The institutional role IGAD played itself during this phase was minimal. Since 2002 IGAD has embarked upon new peace processes under its own auspices, launching peace conferences de-signed to find a compromise between the conflict parties. These efforts have resulted in the forma-tion of two Transitional Federal Governments, of which the second one is still in power, although it faces major problems. IGAD institutions have met very frequently to discuss the issue of Somalia, sup-ported by the IGAD Secretariat, which provided logistical resources as well as offering information and strategies with which to deal with the conflict. IGAD moreover continues to serve as a forum for the member states to discuss the Somali issue.

Despite the lengthy efforts of IGAD and its member states to stabilize the country, the results have been meagre. Somalia still lacks a central government and large parts of the country are still involved in a disas-trous civil war. In the author's opinion, there are sev-eral reasons for this. On the one hand, the major ob-stacles to peace are to be found in Somalia itself. The complexity of the conflict with its various players and agendas makes external peace efforts fundamentally difficult. On the other hand, the internal weakness of IGAD also acts as a constraint on any peace efforts: IGAD lacks sufficient funding as well as institutional and political authority. This is due to widespread inter- and intrastate conflicts as well as, ultimately, a fun-damental absence of economic prosperity and good governance in its member states. In a nutshell: IGAD's peace building capacity is dependent on the politi-cal will of its member states to effectively target the problem in a common effort – an effort which has to this day failed to materialise.

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Overstretched and Overrated?
Prospects of Regional Security Policy in
Africa and its European Support
Conference Report

■ Overstretched and overrated? That was the guiding question at a conference on regional security policy in and for Africa which took place at the Berlin offices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) on 9 and 10 February. The question was in principle quickly answered by the conference participants: a bit overstretched, rather overrated – at least from outside – but on the right path because it is a dynamic one. As the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, emphasised in an opening presentation exploring many facets of the question: Africa has created the political structures and institutions for a comprehensive security policy within little more than a decade and hence with unparalleled speed. This institutional growth has first of all meant, however, that there are now many duplicate structures in existence which are in urgent need of harmonisation. This in particular goes for the overlapping mandates of individual regional organisations and the African Union's merely half-hearted performance of its coordination task. Secondly, many conceptual plans have not been put into operation: clear implementation mechanisms are lacking in many areas. President Chissano cited the African »Stand-By Force« as one example of this.

This diagnosis was confirmed again and again in the course of the conference. There was also general agreement that simple answers will not suffice especially in the African context. There are two reasons for

this: there are many different, closely interwoven political levels (national, sub-regional, regional and international) involved in African security policy and there is a particularly broad interpretation of security in Africa. Second, knowledge about the African security architecture outside Africa is very scant, as evidenced in political, societal and scientific dialogues. One need only compare how much research is performed on »European security governance«, for instance, with how few texts of any substance are to be found on the AU with its numerous regional sub-organisations. There is a marked tendency to speak about Africa in monolithic terms, ignoring the real diversity and differences to be found on the continent.

The conference dedicated itself precisely to this differentiated perspective by explicitly placing regional diversity at the focus. If it was above all the European participants who spoke in terms of an African security architecture at the beginning of the conference, the often-used term acronym »APSA« quickly had the term »peace« added to it, while the definition of security was expanded and above all attention shifted especially to distinctive regional, sub-regional and national features. The plural form, whether applied to security architectures or security cultures, was used frequently in the speeches and presentations. In addition to the AU, the conference consequently placed the focus in particular on the regional economic communities, especially the West African Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa and the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose roles in the management of security policy crises had been evaluated in preparatory FES studies:

• Gavin Cawthra explored the role the SADC has played in Madagascar and Zimbabwe in his study entitled »The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict«. While in the former case the SADC intervened openly and quickly after the toppling of President Ravalomanana, it was much more restrained about the suppression of the Zimbabwean opposition

movement (MDC-T) by President Mugabe's governing party (ZANU-PF) – and this even though the SADC assumed the obligation to intervene in domestic crises and conflicts of its member countries to bring about stability in accords signed in 2001 and 2004. Gawthra identified two explanatory factors at work here: first of all the relatively weak economic ties of the still very new member of Madagascar with other countries, secondly a culture of non-interference between established heads of state – which was vehemently denied by many conference participants (see also the interview with General Martins, p. 37). The study comes to the conclusion that the SADC in its capacity as an inter-governmental organisation is especially dependent on the political will of its member states. The institutional, conceptual and financial capacities of the Secretariat are too limited to allow autonomous action.

• The multiple overlapping of conflicts in Somalia and the importance of IGAD in their resolution was the subject of the study »The Case of IGAD – the Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict«

by Kidist Mulugeta. While IGAD was only involved in conflict resolution through declaratory support for peace initiatives by individual member states until 2002, the Secretariat became more active in the following years, moderating the process towards the formation of two transitional governments. The fact that a solution has yet to been found to the conflict is primarily due to its complexity, as Stefan Brüne also explained in the interview (see p. 26): unresolved interstate conflicts are being carried on as proxy wars within the Somalian civil war. But the internal weakness of IGAD due to the lack of agreement between the two hegemonic states of Ethiopia and Kenya as well as financial and organisational deficits has been anything but helpful in resolving the regional conflict. IGAD remains more of an inter-governmental forum than a politically autonomous organisation. In spite of this, both the study and various statements in the discussion emphasised that IGAD is an unwavering actor on the Horn of Africa which has long been underrated by many western countries. As Professor Brüne put it: »In spite of all its weaknesses, IGAD would have to be founded if it did not exist«.

- ECOWAS was at the heart of the third study »The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict«. Gilles Yabi particularly explored its role in the conflicts in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. In comparison to IGAD and the SADC, ECOWAS has the widest range of experience and the widest range of tools for political and military intervention. For instance, ECOWAS was present in both countries very early on (in Guinea-Bissau since 2005, in Guinea since 2007) with mediation, advisory and election-monitoring commissions, skilfully drawing regional and international public attention to the conflicts brewing there. Each and every conflict-resolution process more or less depends on the willingness of political elites in the conflict countries to accept solutions. The author examines the limits and constraints on regional security architectures in detail.

In addition to the opening presentation by President Chissano, these three studies formed the basis for very open and pointed consistent discussions throughout the entire conference. The first focal topic, which looked at the regional organisations and the AU alone, was followed by comparative discussions of preventive diplomacy, political mediation and security sector reform and the promotion of democratic security sector governance. A concluding panel discussion illuminated the possibilities for Germany and Europe to make a supportive contribution to the further development of the regional security architecture in Africa. This Conference Report does not retrace the individual topics and discussions in any chronological order, instead summing up recurring topics, results, but also unresolved issues under seven points. It is supplemented with five interviews, one general one with President Chissano and one each with experts of the four organisations (AU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD).

First: Evolution Instead of Revolution and the Sluggishness of Institutional Development

It is not necessary to constantly reinvent the wheel. It makes more sense, rather, to repair and maintain it, perhaps even improve it, but at any rate to use it – that is how President Chissano summed up the crux of the matter. The institutions required at the continental and sub-regional levels are in place. In most cases there are clear mechanisms to provide an impulse for further strategic developments on the ba-

sis of these institutions, as has already occurred, for example, with regard to the debate over the reform of the security sector within the AU.

African participants in the conference described these dynamics in a vivid way, making instructive comparisons with the length of time which most Western institutions needed before they were able to function properly, and bewailed the fact that voices from inside and outside Africa constantly call for completely new start-ups. Individual institutions often lack financial and human resources and above all the political will to actually make use of what is already available. The latter is at least understandable in view of the great heterogeneity among African states: one need only compare the number of member states of the AU with that of the EU or also the very different dynamics characterising e.g. the Maghreb and ECOWAS regions. It was also emphasised that, although there are many early warning systems for political crises, it is all too often the case that these only work properly when political interests of the most important states are directly affected and then, when the warning is sounded, unfortunately no »early action« results from the »early warning«. Darfur brutally illustrated these mechanisms: strategic planning was carried out at the level of the AU early on and pointed in the right direction, but political decisions repeatedly lagged far behind.

Sluggishness and dependence on the particular path or trajectory are inimical to any institutional development. This applies particularly to political organisations which have to operate in complex and heterogeneous environments. It has already been noted that the AU is barely ten years old. Many conference participants seconded the appeal for patience voiced by Gernot Erler at the beginning. It was furthermore emphasised that it is crucial to keep intra-organisational factors in mind along with inter-organisational developments.

The frequently cited lack of political will is anything but an African problem, however. Debates over the »dysfunctional« aspects of the Security Council of the United Nations ring familiar. The question remains as to how this can be encouraged, how gaps between heterogeneous interests can be bridged. What role do »windows of opportunity« and media attention play here? What about the role of civil society? The conference participants agreed that the importance of these factors is still significantly underestimated in Africa.

»The complex myriad causes of conflicts is the key political problem of IGAD«

Interview with Professor Dr. Stefan Brüne, GIZ / Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

■ *What challenges face IGAD at present?*

The biggest political challenges are no doubt the unsolved internal and intra-state conflicts of the region as well as a regional constellation of conflicts in which national actors directly or indirectly support opposition movement in neighbouring countries. Examples of this include Somalia and Eritrea. Ethiopia provided some of the Eritrean opposition and Eritrean students the possibility to study in Addis Ababa for the first time. The Eritreans believe they have good reason to support anti-Ethiopian groupings in Somalia as well. On top of this, there are also unresolved historical problems which can be instrumentalised for current purposes. This type of complex interrelationship between causes of conflicts and attempts at managing them is the key political problem faced by IGAD.

In addition to these political challenges, what institutional challenges are most pressing for the IGAD?

Institutionally speaking, the biggest problem is that the institutions which exist have not met over the last few years. There are pure and simple no regular council meetings. The Secretariat of the IGAD has drafted a series of reform plans: expansion of the mandate of the IGAD, a peace and security strategy, an institutional reform strategy and similar. All of these proposals are still awaiting political approval and adoption by the Council of Ministers.

People are now speculating as to why there have not been any council meetings for one and a half years. In my perception of things, technical problems have gotten mixed up with political agendas. To put it in blunt terms: the Ethiopians have the IGAD presidency at present. And they are not inclined to give it up, among other things due to developments in the Sudan. The Sudan would have been a potential candidate for successor. So the

IGAD has had the same presidency for three years, while under the IGAD Statutes this is supposed to change every year. The Ethiopians are no exception, though. The Kenyans and Sudanese behaved exactly the same way before.

This conference after all among other things focused on comparisons between the IGAD, SADC and ECOWAS. Would it be desirable to make the IGAD into more than a forum and more like a comprehensive organisation such as the SADC and ECOWAS?

This question is difficult to answer because there are overlapping mandates in this East African region. The East African Community (EAC) is developing at a very fast pace right now and very successfully, too: an attempt is being made to establish a common currency and freedom of movement throughout the region. Two new states have just joined, Burundi and Rwanda. A lot is happening at all levels – technical, functional and political. Kenya and Uganda are at the same time IGAD members. These two countries of course have an interest in not duplicating the EAC. The key issue for these two states in the IGAD is always Somalia – and where Somalia is involved, this also implicitly always involves the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. These overlapping memberships combined with claims to hegemony are impeding the further development of IGAD.

If one wanted to look at things from a purely functional perspective, five regional African organisations would be sufficient in my opinion. If I had my wish in this respect, I would wish that the IGAD and the EAC merge. This is of course pretty illusory, as these are established organisations and institutional interests would oppose it.

How do you assess the degree of networking between regional African organisations? What would be desirable?

There is an exchange at the personal level. They get together every now and then on Mauritius. The political will to engage in networking in a technically efficient manner is very limited. In particular the Secretariat of the IGAD has such a weak mandate that it is not able to push forward the networking process, either.

What role can institutions at broad levels such as the African Union and, indirectly, the European Union play here?

In Djibouti we are constantly being called on by all sides to strengthen cooperation with the African Union. Vice versa, IGAD has called upon the AU to move more in its direction. For example, almost all IGAD communiqués over the last few years have been adopted one to one by the AU – primarily thanks to Ethiopian influence. This can be interpreted as a successful attempt on the part of Ethiopia to use IGAD for its own ends while at the same time putting an African cloak over it. In de facto terms, however, there is scarcely any idea on how this cooperation between IGAD and the AU could be made more efficient in institutional and technical terms and put on a more permanent footing.

And what is the situation with non-African players?

Most of them are actually organised bilaterally – for example, Djibouti with France or Japan. The only regional format is actually the European Union's Horn of Africa Initiative. That was an attempt to establish a 6+1 formula as a reaction to the suspension of Eritrean membership in the IGAD so as to bring Eritrea back into the IGAD fold. These attempts continue, but they have not been very successful thus far and are more characterised by goodwill.

It would be extremely desirable, however, for there to be a major international effort to solve the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and the political impasse resulting from it. This conflict is one of the most expensive wars in recent history and one has to ask where these countries, which describe themselves as being poor, find the money for the immense sums they spend on the weapons they need to wage such a war. Ethiopia receives almost one-third of its budget from other countries. Solving this conflict at any rate holds the key to pacifying and developing this region as a whole. To do this, the AU, EU and other regional organisations must cooperate in a more targeted and sustained manner.

Conducted on 10 February 2011 at FES Berlin
by Julian Junk

Second: The Principle of Subsidiarity on the Basis of Strong Regions

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU forms the core of the so-called African peace and security architecture. Wherever security policy in Africa is concerned, the PSC receives a lot of attention. Less well known are the security policy instruments and institutions of individual regional organisations and even less yet the coordinating and harmonising goals set out in Article 3 (I) of the constitutive treaty of the AU. The African Union officially recognises eight regional economic communities (see also Art. 16 of the Protocol of the AU on the African Peace and Security Architecture). These communities are developing at highly differing paces and depths. By comparison the debate over a »Europe of different speeds« seems academic. The conference participants were for the most part in agreement that the principle of subsidiarity is assigned special importance in the African context. A certain security policy coordination within the framework of the AU is needed, but the regional organisations should continue to be strengthened considerably, and even form the backbone: thus there should be no weak »committee of the regions« like in the European context, and instead at least a strong security and economic-policy pillar in the African peace and security architecture.

In all this, it is necessary to keep in mind, however, that the depth of integration in the individual regions varies greatly. This is on the one hand desirable, as it leads to the crystallisation of various »best practices« over time – this was the hope expressed by several experts taking part in the conference. Different regions also require different strategies for solutions. On the other hand, to develop further it is also necessary to disseminate information in the form of »best practices«. Coordination mechanisms and consultation forums between the regional organisations must be strengthened considerably and this needs to happen soon.

The question as to whether it is desirable in the first place, or whether it even overextends some organisations, for the medium- term objective is to have a broad, inter-regional, comparable set of instruments available remains unresolved. The regional organisations were originally founded as economic communities. Political and military tasks and capabilities were usually quickly added in most cases.

One classic example of this was the development of ECOWAS in the 1990s. In the meantime an often implicit consensus has come about that regional organisations need to master the art of economic integration as well as political and security dimensions. It was for this reason that at least a latent danger of becoming overstretched was held to exist at the conference – some regions were attempting to develop these dimensions too quickly and too ambitiously – although reference was at the same time made to a broad understanding of security policy. Gilles Yabi noted taking the example of ECOWAS that it was less a question of the breadth of instruments and more a question of the right management of expectations.

In this connection, the question as to the right number of regional organisations is always virulent. At minimum stated was »five«, which would mean that IGAD and the EAC would have to work together in some form or another. The conference participants agreed, however, that geographic overlapping of memberships should not be lasting. Here external actors also need to forge ahead on new paths: multilateral organisations (such as the EU) or bilateral support (such as by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) support the formation of regional organisations and channel a considerable portion of development aid through these. There are thus skewed incentives both of a financial and political nature to be a member of multiple communities.

Looking across the broad range of policy fields, the West African ECOWAS has clearly progressed the furthest. Cross-border mobility has always been quite common in this region. This facilitates various steps in integration. ECOWAS is, however, as some of the participants in the discussion emphasised, not a rationally »designed« organisation: on the contrary, the community has grown organically hand in hand with the challenges it has been called upon to meet. As a security community, ECOWAS can be evaluated in terms of its management of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Although the SADC in Southern Africa possesses a similarly broad set of instruments, the political will at least is not yet present to lead to a deeper political integration, but merely economic. The EAC, the East African Economic Community, is highly integrated, but

only economically so far. On the Horn of Africa, the IGAD on the other hand is being increasingly weakened by the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in Somalia and by the dual hegemony of Kenya and Ethiopia, a constellation which is not particularly cooperative. Too weak as a political forum and economically lagging behind the EAC, the IGAD needs to undergo fundamental change. In political terms, Central Africa remains the problem region. ECCAS has hardly gotten off the ground. The integration of Maghreb states is among other things weakened by diverging views on Western Sahara. The momentum of the democratic upheavals taking place in the Arab world at present will be interesting and at the same time have immediate implications for African efforts at integration.

Among the regional organisations, it is therefore important to keep on eye on ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC – especially in their interaction with the AU. It would be wrong to speak of an African security architecture. The dynamics of the interaction between security architectures, on the other hand, will be exciting to follow, as will efforts to establish the principle of subsidiarity in multilateral security issues.

The conference drew considerable elements of its dynamics from constructive, intrepid comparisons between very different regional organisations within Africa, but also inter-continental comparisons. All too often debates are strangled by pointing out the uniqueness of different conflicts or the complexity of regional constellations. This is the case, as some of the conference participants noted, especially when dealing with African issues. One important lesson of the conference was therefore to establish that the »balancing act« between the regional context and inter-regional generalisation can definitely succeed and lead to productive discussions.

»ECOWAS is currently undergoing radical change«

Interview with Major Ibrahim Siratigui Diarra, Executive Assistant, Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the ECOWAS Commission

■ What challenges face ECOWAS politically and institutionally right now?

At present it is of course the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. ECOWAS has been working feverishly on a solution since the beginning of the crisis there. At first as a mediator between the parties, then as an observer of the elections and now we even have to consider more far-reaching intervention. In addition we are of course also addressing the upcoming elections in Niger, Benin and Cape Verde.

In institutional terms this is a phase of radical change for ECOWAS. Next week important decisions for the future will be made at the summit meeting. We will probably have to develop a Commission structure in which all of the member countries are represented by a commissioner – very similar to the European Union. As a result, we will then have 15 instead of nine members of the Commission. This will solve a fundamental problem.

Which problem to be specific?

A legitimacy problem. If every member country is represented there will be fewer acceptance problems.

Will ECOWAS not perhaps become more cumbersome in its decision-making processes?

Yes, perhaps. But we are discussing right now how the expansion of the Commission will also have to be accompanied by a significant expansion in personnel and that staff must be appointed on the basis of merits. This will provide a new impetus. But although this expansion of the Commission is a major change, it does not mean that it will become cumbersome. It is always important to stress that ECOWAS is basically still an economic community. The mandate must be expanded very quickly and in a comprehensive manner – politically and militarily. This is where reform processes come in.

Are the Europeans able, and should they, support these reforms?

There are always issues involving technical, financial and logistical support. There are also numerous initiatives here. My desire, however, would be for ECOWAS to be involved in all project developments in a partnership-like manner from the very beginning. We are better able to assess needs up close on the ground. If stakeholders are involved too late, this all too often leads to inappropriately designed projects – this goes both for projects of the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union.

On top of this, there is a high level of complexity with regard to communications: there are strong bilateral

Third: Expanded Security and Democratisation

African security institutions are based on a very broad definition of security which seeks to expand political, economic and social development possibilities. Three reasons for this can be identified. First of all, similar to in Europe, most efforts at integration found their beginnings in particular at the regional level of economic communities. Sensitivity for the nexus between security and economic development was for this reason a given right from the outset. Secondly, African societies and states have always been highly involved in current strands of the development-policy debate.

Notions such as »human security«, which quickly became en vogue in the development-policy discussion, thus diffused rapidly. Thirdly, multilateral security institutions were developed within very short periods of time – at least measured in terms of European standards and development – and are still part of the recent past: The Cold War was long past, the norms prevailing in the 1990s became paramount.

The link between security and democratisation was emphasised at the conference, particularly in an internal African discussion. Very sceptical and

relations with individual countries such as France. Sometimes they speak on behalf of the European Union, sometimes they address bilateral projects. It is very difficult for the stakeholders to steer things in a proper manner. Multilaterally coordinated procedures are preferable.

How do you assess the dialogue between the regional organisations of Africa?

That actually does not play any role in daily work, even if one is very much aware of what the other regional organisations are doing. They do compare notes. Every now and then at some meetings or in mutual visits. But there are no formalised, regular, focused exchange procedures. It would be desirable, for instance, to build a dense network of liaison offices. To date only ECOWAS has one with the AU.

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self-critical voices could always be heard whenever the issues of depth and timing of democratisation processes cropped up. While the ultimate need for democratic structures to establish due process of law and legitimised security sectors was not contested, some participants were not at a loss to draw attention to the destabilising impact of elections, especially in the case of fragile stateness and an absence of societal cohesion. This was perhaps the most controversial issue at the conference.

All of the participants in the conference emphasised, however, that sustainable security and conflict resolution require long-term strategies which are mirrored in democratic governance structures in the security sector. As one participant put it: »The republic and not solely the police and military should serve as the standard for reform of the security sector«. Although this realisation has been gaining currency for some time now, only now are comprehensive strategies being devised by the African Union and above all ECOWAS. Certain hopes have been placed on the current so-called »Zero Draft« document on security sector reform, which is to be adopted at the AU summit in June 2011. ECOWAS has been travelling down this path for

many years, and among other things laid the cornerstone for the operative link between democracy, good governance and security in the 2001 Supplementary Protocol. The extent to which ideas can be adopted from the ECOWAS example was intensively discussed at the conference. Security sector reforms only function when they are rooted in all level of political life: they have to take into account human beings just as well as special aspects of national states and must consequently never be designed from a solely regional perspective. Security sector reforms must therefore adopt a pluralist approach. As was underscored by a large number of statements at the conference, it is crucial that reforms do not merely remain at the conceptual level: the very concrete, piecemeal implementation and establishment of constant evaluation mechanisms, especially in the absence of acute crises, must be part and parcel of any debate over strategy. And finally, the focus must not solely be placed on post-conflict situations, as has so often been the case in the past: preventive elements are just as important.

Fourth: An African Path

Does a broad African definition of security contain unique aspects then? This question was repeatedly raised by the African participants in the conference, while protesting the limits of the dominant Western concepts in the African context. In institutional terms the close interlinkage between peace and security is no doubt interesting, as is already reflected in the names given to the PSC and APSA. From Africans' own perspective, however, the following uniquely African factors can also be identified: solidarity and partnership as very fundamental organisational principles, »human security«, at the centre of any security-policy conception, the importance of sub-regional integration and the diversity of integration, an eye to detail in the implementation of fundamental security-policy documents or security-policy »roadmaps« following conflicts, such as most recently in Madagascar, and finally the historical and ethnic specification of the context for security-policy ideas. These comparisons between non-Western and Western notions of security were only touched upon at the conference and appear in general not to have been discussed in any extensive way, either. At any rate, this offers »food for discussion« in the future.

Without exception the participants in the conference all called for a stronger voice for Africa in institutions involved with global security policy. Africa must be provided more of a say both on the UN Security Council as well as in the UN Secretariat, even in existing structures.

Fifth: Well-meant Hegemony and Drivers of Regional Integration

There is a great deal of heterogeneity between strong and weak states within regions themselves. How should this factor be assessed with regard to regional integration? It is generally agreed that hegemonic stability plays a role in alliances and multilateral institutions. Examples of this are without a doubt the role of the USA in European integration, but also in the European security structure (NATO). If one looks at the SADC and the role which South Africa plays in this region, but also at ECOWAS and Nigeria's dominance, similar phenomena can be observed. Is it not simply the case that there are no such hegemonic constellations in the Maghreb and Central Africa?

These hegemonic states have a major responsibility in a two-fold respect: first of all, they have to work in a positive manner for regional integration, and secondly, they must not lose legitimacy themselves wherever their own internal affairs are involved, as they have a veto right in de facto terms. The internal state of Nigeria was repeatedly brought up and discussed critically in this connection.

Hegemonic structures may block development not only because the hegemon is not benevolent (»benevolent hegemony«), but also because there are rival hegemons. Before the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire broke out openly, it was Nigeria's only rival in West Africa, although the two states were able to come to terms with each other within the framework of ECOWAS. The situation is different in East Africa, where Kenya and Ethiopia warily keep each other in check, weakening IGAD. The EAC is at present more dynamic because, in addition to its relative cultural homogeneity, Kenya's claim to a leadership role is undisputed.

»Rhetoric and action still diverge too much in the AU«

Interview with Dr. Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, Secretary of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

■ *As the conference repeatedly established, the African Union has without a doubt achieved much in a brief period of time. It is, as it were, a success story in institutional terms. But one can always improve things even more. What improvements would you like to see?*

My first desire would of course be to continue to strengthen the capabilities of individual institutions of the AU in terms of their interlinkages with the individual member states. The AU is still young; many institutions were hastily set up. This has created a gap between the intuitional structure at the level of the African Union and support for these institutions at the level of the member countries – rhetoric and action still diverge too greatly in the AU. This applies, for example, to the African »Stand-By Force« and the »early warning system«. We don't even talk about the »peace funds« any more – they contain so little financial resources – even though a decision was just taken to no longer devote six, but rather twelve percent of the AU budget to this fund within three years' time. A ray of hope for the future.

The linkage between the AU and its regional organisations has to be strengthened in the same manner. Coordination is very weak. Let me give you one example: The »flagship« of the AU is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It is an African innovation and in principle functions excellently. But there are deficits, especially in its cooperation with regional organisations. They are not involved in determining the monthly focal points, for example, even though they are much closer to the crises which have to be managed. It would make a lot of sense to also consult with ECOWAS when the PSC is to address the situation in Côte d'Ivoire next month. The regional organisations know much better what groupings should be involved and what political implications are to be expected. There are no clear mechanisms for involvement here. These are urgently needed, however.

What should such a mechanism look like?

Best of all would be to have a mechanism in the form of monthly meetings – or every two or three months. The main thing is to have a clearly agreed-upon rhythm. This is so important because the PSC does a lot of joint planning with the RECs (the regional organisations – or regional economic communities): the Stand-By Force, the early warning mechanism, the Peace Fund. This feeling of togetherness and cooperation is fundamental, as otherwise it looks like the PSC is determining regional policy from the top down. The AU institutions have to be strengthened on the whole, however, both in terms of human resources and financially.

Where do the strengths and weaknesses of these so very different regional organisations lie? How can they be coordinated with these differences?

You are right there: the RECs indeed differ very greatly in terms of their institutional development, their economic power and their claims to their own security-policy roles. But here as well one can take the development of the African Stand-By Force as a good example. The Southern African and the West African regions have simply progressed further, North Africa lags far, far behind. That indeed poses a major coordination problem.

There is another problem on top of all this: there are too many contradictions and disagreements within the individual regions. Take the North Africans and the problem of Western Sahara. If one wants to identify a reason why the degree of integration is so weak in North Africa – although are so many binding elements such as language, religion and culture – it is disagreement over Western Sahara. Some say that it is unacceptable for one African country to treat another one like a colony. For these countries, Western Sahara constitutes a decolonisation problem. Other countries instead emphasise the principle of state sovereignty and autonomy. This dispute goes a long way in explaining why North African states have scarcely integrated with one another and it has an impact on their continental African policies. The AU is a union of member states and not of regions. The AU thus

has difficulties when there is a dispute between two member states. In the case of Western Sahara, it actually needs a common political strategy which could minimise the impact of regional differences.

Let's go to West Africa. Here there is traditionally no understanding for the concept of a regional hegemon. You referred to a benevolent hegemon before during the conference. I have doubts about this concept in the African context. In most regional contexts it is inconceivable for one state to openly dominate other ones. Nigeria has to lead by example within the framework of ECOWAS, at least on the surface. This means that Nigeria has to be politically stable and economically dynamic. Nigeria will then also be a member of the PSC: it is a permanent member in de facto terms. If it no longer leads by example, Nigeria will be challenged at the regional level. On the whole, however, there is a strong cultural cohesion and tradition of cross-border mobility in this region.

Let's look at South Africa. The international community views South Africa to be a leading African power. Zimbabwe and Angola object to this, for instance. They say that South Africa is too new as a state in its current condition. It is simply not ready to represent Africa as a whole; nor is it represented in enough international institutions. Thus these states only accept proposals from South Africa for Southern Africa or the entire continent with great reluctance. But South Africa has the biggest private economy and the biggest industrial sector. South Africa is an economic power. So when in the reform of the UN Security Council it is attempted to identify countries which could represent Africa as

a permanent member, Nigeria and Egypt are often mentioned as well. But South Africa usually outscores them with respect to most of the criteria. In Central Africa, ECCAS, the feeling of togetherness is simply lacking. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, wanted to join the SADC even though in geographic and cultural terms it beyond all doubt belongs to Central Africa. Rwanda and Burundi have joined the EAC. It is bit more than the usual African chaos that is taking place there. The problem has even reached the point where in addition to the lack of regional cohesion, there is also a lack of internal national cohesion.

Finally, let's look at East Africa and the Horn of Africa, the IGAD region. This is also a region full of contradictions. A lot here depends on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflicts and the situation in Somalia, which are at the centre of a struggle over influence between Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. The preferred method there is to mutually weaken each other. Kenya and Ethiopia have for historical reasons also been afraid of a strong Somalia, as the latter claims territory in these countries. This region is also very difficult to integrate. At the most, this is possible in the area of security policy.

To sum up: West Africa has the greatest chances of integration, followed by parts of East Africa without the Horn of Africa. Then comes the SADC, although here I would attach the biggest caveat because the biggest issue in this region is the cohesion of the individual states. I do not see any major chances for integration in Central and North Africa at present. The EU cannot try to do very much in this complex game on the whole. It is attempted

Sixth: Global Norms, Morality and Double Standards

A sixth topical focal point which will no doubt require attention in future discussions is the role of global norms in the design of the African security architecture.

First of all: the principle of self-determination and state sovereignty. The discussion on this exposed the limits of what would appear to be globally and

regionally accepted norms. To what extent is it possible for states to break apart? The diversity on the African continent is also interesting here, especially because most African states on the one hand profit especially from this hard-fought insecurity as part of their founding story, while on the other hand they are affected by arbitrary borders which pay no heed to ethnic borders. The referendum in Southern Sudan – and the participants in the conference agreed on this point – has not yet been understood

to coordinate as much as possible. This is the most promising as a result of the African security architecture and the Stand-By Force.

President Chissano mentioned the three principles of the AU yesterday: African unity, the responsibility to protect African states and African priority in the case of African problems. All of these points are centred on Africa. Should there not also be a strategy of international commitments by Africa? Africa as an equal partner even outside Africa?

Indeed: it still sounds a bit defensive if one chooses to see it this way, but African history is simply dominated by asymmetry with Europe. That is why it is important to rely on one's own strengths. The word »partnership« is strategically important to the AU.

We enter into »partnership« especially with the EU, i.e. these actors meet as equals. And we are diversifying access to partnership: there are now partnerships with Latin America, China, South Korea, Turkey as well as many other partnerships which we are planning right now. The self-perception which is starting to gain currency in the AU is not »Africa first« and the others following in second or third place. No, it is a sincere partnership which is being sought. Countries get together. They establish that both partners have certain needs, or have resources and then they trace out an equal and transparent path to mutual support. That is our understanding of solid partnership.

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in its entirety in terms of repercussions for regional power tectonics. The example of Western Sahara also shows, however, what potential for conflict slumbers in such frustrated needs for independence: regional cooperation between the Maghreb states is still paralysed by their disagreement over how to deal with this case.

Secondly, the responsibility of African states to protect African citizens is accepted as a fundamental

principle of the African Union. Whether or not this involves a primarily global norm or not was discussed in a controversial manner. The frequently called-for non-interference in regional affairs runs up against limits here. The ensuing discussion focused on the example of the hybrid mission structure in Darfur, which at its core is an African Mission (AU), but which is supposed to profit from the know-how of the UN. The controversial slogan »more AU and less UN« was spelled out more precisely in the debate to

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the effect that more AU is desirable for reasons of legitimacy but equally so because of the AU's better understanding of special regional factors, although stronger support is needed in terms of financial resources and logistic capabilities. A subsidiarity principle must therefore apply here: regional and continental solutions must have priority and there should only be as much international interference or support as necessary.

Thirdly, when power asymmetries predominate in the evaluation of apparently generally valid norms, regional efforts at integration and foreign support are quickly stripped of legitimacy. How is the role of the Zimbabwean President Mugabe to be assessed in mediation efforts involving electoral processes? How can the EU work in a credible manner when Hungarian media laws or refusal to recognise election results in the Gaza Strip contradict the norms and standards which are even called for in Africa? These controversial examples were repeatedly discussed at the conference. There should not be any double standards. The success of development aid and security-policy support are for the most part based on the credibility and integrity of the partners, according to Rolf Mützenich. Gernot Erler emphasised the fact that Europeans have a vital interest in a well functioning African infrastructure as well as the German focus on support for civil society.

»The best means is individual responsibility«

Interview with retired General George Martins, Director of Pax Africa in South Africa

■ *The study which we were previously discussing within the framework of the conference compared two SADC member states in which the SADC had to take action, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Are these the biggest political challenges in your opinion?*
Yes, these are the most important topics for the SADC at present. I would like to add to this the situation in the east and south of the Congo. Here as well the question is how the SADC could become involved in a constructive way. In addition, there are still chronic problems and regularly recurring challenges, for example with human rights in Swaziland or the holding of elections in Lesotho.

Does the SADC have the capabilities to deal with these challenges?
There is once again a chronic problem here as well:

the lack of financial resources and too few staff. Economic integration has to move forward as well. The region is stagnating, as talks between a relatively homogenous EU and the many voices in the SADC have recently shown. This is also a key component for further integration on the African continent: an African Union without integrated, lively regions is inconceivable.

There were controversial discussions in the plenary group on the extent to which historically evolved bilateral loyalties from the time of the liberation movements are still so important that they massively impede the SADC's possibilities to exert influence. What is your opinion on this?
I do not share this view. This is not a problem specific to southern Africa. Look at Germany's diplomacy within the EU in the Euro crisis. There are simply many things which one cannot say in public, and other things that one can. That is the essence of diplomacy. If you have differences with Mugabe, you cannot completely rely on public diplomacy. That would be futile. Independently of this, enough public statements are being issued and demands being made by South Africa and

the SADC calling for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe and recognition of the election results. South Africa itself has a major interest in bringing Zimbabwe back on a stable path once again. The flow of refugees is starting to destabilise the entire region and constitutes a major problem for the health system as well as the social system as a whole.

How do you assess the coordination between the individual regional organisations? Should the AU be more active here or do the regional organisations have to take things into their own hands?
Both are necessary; they do not exclude each other. Regional organisations must cooperate. They must communicate with each other and compare notes on a case-by-case basis. The African Union can coordinate here and open up topical channels of communication. The AU already does this very successfully – just take the African Stand-by Force and the regional brigades. But such mechanisms can always and must be improved.

What improvements do you have in mind?
We have too many regional organisations and they overlap. That is inefficient and confusing. In particular because Africa is still a poor continent. We have to manage our resources better.

Some participants in the conference drew attention to the reluctance of the SADC to accept Western aid and support. Autonomy is argued to be preferable to such dependency. What are your thoughts on this?
I think that the SADC is anything but averse to help. There are many ongoing projects which are supported by the Europeans, for example. It was not too long ago that the donor countries and organisations took things into their own hands and began proposing all kinds of projects. But capacities and clear rules of procedure were simply lacking within the SADC to help develop and administrate such projects. They are working on this, but for the time being it does not make much sense to keep proposing additional projects which are doomed to failure. This hurt the legitimacy of all the partners. That is why the SADC perhaps seems a bit hesitant, even it is actively working on a sustainable institutional structure.

But of course there is still the aspect that they are aware of their own strengths and capabilities. The SADC wants to do as much as possible itself, which is after all what the donor countries rightly call for. The best means is self-responsibility: to master a process and consolidate and support what has been achieved one must make the financial resources for this available oneself. The SADC is working on this sustainable and desirable solution.

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■ The Work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in the Area of Security Policy in Africa

»Democratic structures lead to stability and peace. At the same time, these structures can only be stable and of lasting duration in an environment of peace.«
This connection described by the Honorary Chairperson of the FES, Anke Fuchs, is nowhere more strikingly evident than in Africa. It is with this in mind that the FES is working with political stakeholders on the design of a comprehensive security policy at the national, regional and continental levels.

Understanding of security policy

The work of the FES is based on an all-embracing understanding of security policy, at the heart of which are people. A policy which makes use of wide-ranging instruments which go far beyond military means, which includes parliaments and civil society stakeholders in building and implementing democratic structures and places security forces under civilian supervision and democratic control, which stresses the prevention of violence and crises, which presupposes an analysis of the root causes of conflicts, and which is based on effective regional and multilateral cooperation and integration.

Strategy

The FES supports its partners in becoming more actively involved in the security policy dialogue. For instance the FES seeks to raise awareness and strengthen the expertise of political actors by providing analyses, offering consulting services and carrying out sensitisation measures. Secondly it contributes to the establishment of a culture of political dialogue on security policy issues by creating appropriate dialogue forums. In this the FES views assessment of gender roles and gender justice to be self-evident elements of security-policy analyses and work strategies.

Partners

The partners and target groups of the FES are political decision-makers, members of governments and executives in regional organisations, national and regional parliaments, political parties, journalists and representatives of the media. At the same time the FES works closely with African think-tanks and universities, training centres, civil society organisations and networks and international organisations (e.g. UNREC, UNIDIR, DCAF). In its work it also supports and fosters the dialogue with representatives of security forces.

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Appendix

Programme

Wednesday, 9th February 2011

9.00 – 9.15	Welcome by **Dr. Gernot Erler**, Deputy Head of the Social Democratic Party Group in the German Parliament, former Minister of State
9.15 – 9.30	Welcoming address by **Christiane Kesper**, Head of the Division of International Cooperation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
9.30 – 10.00	Keynote Address by the former President of Mozambique, **Joaquim Alberto Chissano**, Chairperson of the Joaquim Chissano Foundation »African problems and their African solutions – is the African Peace and Security Architecture suited to address current security threats in Africa?«
10.30 – 15.45	**Session I: The Role of RECs in Conflicts and Political Crises** What are the recent experiences of RECs in managing violent conflict and political crises? Three case studies will be presented with a focus on the respective RECs' performance and its successes and inadequacies in addressing the crisis in order to stimulate a debate over the current status of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Moderator: **Arnd Henze**, Deputy head of the Foreign Programme Group at Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR)
10.30 – 11.45	The Cases of SADC and Madagascar/Zimbabwe Input: **Dr. Gavin Cawthra**, CDSM, University of the Witwatersrand Comment: **Kathrin Meißner**, Resident Representative FES-Zimbabwe
11.45 – 13.00	The Case of IGAD and Somalia Input: **Kidist Mulugeta Kebede**, Research Consultant, Governance Section of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Comment: **Professor Dr. Stefan Brüne**, IGAD/GIZ Project
14.30 – 15.45	The Cases of ECOWAS and Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Input: **Dr. Gilles Olakounlé Yabi**, ICG West-Africa Comment: **Major Ibrahim Siratigui Diarra**, Executive Assistant, Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, ECOWAS-Commission
16.15 – 17.45	**Session II: RECs' Capacities for Preventive Diplomacy and Political Mediation** With reference to the case studies presented, experts and practitioners will shed more light on RECs' capacities to intervene politically in order to prevent crises and mediate conflict by addressing the following questions in particular: What means are available for political intervention? What are the constraints, both politically and technically (e.g., institutional capacitiy)? Who has taken the lead and what experience has been gained in the cooperation between RECs, the AU and the international community? Moderator: **Arnd Henze**, Deputy head of the Foreign Programme Group at Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) **Dr. Admore Mupoki Kambudzi**, Secretary of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU **Major Ibrahim Siratigui Diarra**, Executive Assistant, Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, ECOWAS-Commission **Dr. Rolf Mützenich**, MdB, Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Parliamentary Party Group of the SPD in the German Bundestag **Ambassador Harro Adt**, Special Representative, Council of the EU for the Mano River Region a.D. **Marina Peter**, Sudan Focal Point Europe **Dr. Wullson Mvomo Ela**, Professor at the International Relations Institute at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon

Thursday, 10th February 2011

9.00 – 10.30   **Session III: Regional Approaches to Security Sector Governance**
There is growing understanding that for lasting conflict resolution, structural reforms are necessary in order to facilitate democratic Security Sector Governance (SSG); AU and RECs are therefore becoming increasingly involved in Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives. What is the leverage and what are the resources and current initiatives available to AU and RECs to promote democratic SSG?
The executive-driven integration process furthermore raises the question: How democratic is regional security policy in Africa? How can the involvement of civil society and parliaments become more meaningful? What are the prospects for transparency, an overview and review mechanisms within the AU and RECs?
Moderator: **Sebastian Sperling**, FES Abuja
The AU SSR strategy – Status Quo by **Dr. Norman Mlambo**, AU SSR-Coordinator
The ECOWAS SSG concept and action plan by **Professor Massaër Diallo**, General Coordinator, WANSED
SSG/R as a national challenge by **Gen. Pal Martins rtd.**, Director Pax Africa, South Africa
and **Gen. Andrew Owoye Azazi**, National Security Advisor, Nigeria

11.00 – 12.45   **Session IV: German and European Support for Regional Security Policy in Africa: Between New Approaches in Peacekeeping and a New Focus on Political Mediation Capacities?**
With several years of substantial German and EU support for regional security policy in Africa and against the background of the conference's discussions: What are the lessons learnt, and what future priorities are needed? How does one define success, and how is it to be measured? What is the time frame for European intervention? In particular, how can African perspectives be strengthened in the current peacekeeping debate, and how can regional capacities for political mediation be supported?
Moderator: **Professor Dr. Hertha Däubler-Gmelin**, Professor at FU Berlin, former Minister of Justice
Perspectives on Peacekeeping in Africa by **Peter Schumann**, former Regional Coordinator UNMIS South Sudan
Strengthening African capacities for mediation and conflict management by **Dr. Wolfgang Manig**, Head of Division, Federal Foreign Office Germany
African needs and challenges facing donor coordination by **Roger Middleton**, Consultant Researcher, Chatham House

12.45 – 14.00   **Proposal for a Conference Report: Main Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Points of Departure for Further Debate**
Input by rapporteur **Julian Junk**, Researcher, Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main

◼ Short Introduction of the Panellists

Following his law studies, **Ambassador Harro Adt** entered into the Foreign Service in 1972, working inter alia in Calcutta, Geneva, Paris and Brussels as well as serving as ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Central African Republic, Mali and South Africa. During his time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin he held the post of Commissioner for Africa. After this he served as special envoy of the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the Mano River Region until his retirement in 2010.

General Andrew Owoye Azazi is the National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and a former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of Nigeria. He was appointed by the Former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. General Azazi also served as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) between 2006 and 2007, replacing General Martin Luther Agwai. Before his appointment as COAS, he was General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1st Division, Kaduna. General Azazi holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the University of Ibadan, and has completed the Staff Intelligence and Security Course, School of Service Intelligence, Ashford, Kent, UK and Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Programme, Defence Intelligence College, Washington DC, United States. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff College Nigeria, and the National War College, Nigeria, where he won the President and Commander-in-Chief's merit award for best all-round performance. Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Professor Dr. Stefan Brüne has been the GIZ Team Leader acting as advisor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Djibouti since 2008. He wrote his doctoral dissertation at the Free University of Berlin on the topic »Underdevelopment and Radical Military Rule in Ethiopia« in 1984 – 1985. He received his interdisciplinary post-doctoral degree (in social geography and political science) at the University of Osnabrück in 1995 with his post-doctoral thesis entitled »Between Hegemony and the Development Claim. French Policy towards Africa South of the Sahara«.

Professor Dr. Gavin Cawthra holds the Chair in Defence and Security Management at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM) at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. He is a former Director of the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, and was previously co-ordinator of the Military Research Group, Director of the Committee on South African War Resistance, and Research Officer at the International Defence and Aid Fund (UK). Gavin Cawthra holds a PhD from King's College, University of London and a BA Honours (cum laude) from the University of Natal. He has published eight books as well as numerous journal and other articles. Having spent many years in exile during the apartheid period, he was active in the liberation movement, specialising in research into security issues. He has lectured in more than 20 countries in Africa and wider afield and has received a number of international scholarships, research grants and awards. A consultant to government, NGOs and international organisations, Professor Cawthra lectures at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management in policy studies and security studies, convenes a master's degree in management of security and is director of research at the School.

President Joaquim Alberto Chissano was born in 1939 in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. As a young man he was forced to flee because of his political affiliations and sought refuge in France. In 1962, he travelled to Tanzania and became a founding member of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Chissano played a fundamental role in the 1974 negotiations on the independence of Mozambique between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Government, taking office as prime minister of the transitional government. When Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, Chissano was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Following the tragic death of President Samora Machel in 1986, Chissano was elected as his successor.
He introduced positive socio-economic reforms, culminating in the adoption of the 1990 Constitution that led to a multi-party system and to an open market in Mozambique. Chissano also headed success-

ful negotiations with former rebels, ending 16 years of a destabilizing war in 1992. In 1994, he won the first multiparty elections in the history of his country, and was re-elected in 1999. Despite being permitted to do so by the Constitution, he voluntarily decided not to stand in the 2004 presidential elections.

He is currently the Chairperson of the Joaquim Chissano Foundation (aims: peace promotion, social and economic development and culture) and the Africa Forum of Former African Heads of State and Government. He has received the highest awards from many countries as well as several prizes, including the inaugural Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership in 2007.

Professor Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin was a member of the German Bundestag from 1972 – 2009, serving there as Chairman of the Legal Committee (1983 – 1993), the Committee for Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture (2005 – 2009) and the Committee for Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid (2005 – 2009). She was moreover Chairperson of the Legal Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly in the Council of Europe from 2008 to 2009. She held the position of Attorney General in the cabinet of Gerhard Schröder from 1998 to 2002.

She was elected Deputy Federal Chairperson of the SPD for the period 1988 – 1997. Ms Däubler-Gmelin has been an honorary professor performing a lectureship at the Otto Suhr Institute at the Free University of Berlin since 1995.

Professor Massaër Diallo is a Senegalese philosopher and political scientist. He holds a degree from the University Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne. He is a former leader of the Senegalese student movement in France (AESF) in the years 1970 – 1980. He was a researcher at the House of Human Sciences (MSH) in Paris as part of a Programme of Anthropology South / North (1983 – 1985). He is the former Director General of the University of Mutants (Gorée, Senegal). In this capacity he was the founder of the IEPS (Institute for Political and Strategic Studies). From July 2004 to December 2009 he was principal deputy head of the Conflict Dynamics Governance, Peace and Security Division, at the SWAC / OECD. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the Institute Diderot, the endowment fund for the development of social economy of Covéa since March 2009. He is co-founder and member of the Regional Alliance for Governance

and Conflict Prevention in West Africa, a member of the Group of Studies and Strategic Research on Africa (GERAS) of IRSEM (Research Institute of Strategic and Military Studies), the administrator of the Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (IEPS) in Dakar, Senegal, and the current general coordinator of the West African Network for Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED).

Major Ibrahim Siratigui Diarra, a Mali national, is the Executive assistant to the Commissioner of the ECOWAS, Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (DPAPS) of the Economic Community of West African States Commission (ECOWAS). As a member of the military forces, he holds a degree from Saint-Cyr Military Academy, France in 2001.

Dr. Gernot Erler is the Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Party Group of the SPD in the German Bundestag and served as State Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the period 2005 – 2009. After studying history, Slavic languages and political science, Mr. Erler first worked in the field of social science. He has been an elected member of the German Bundestag since 1987. His primary focus there has been on the policy fields of peace and security as well as disarmament and arms control. Mr. Erler has written a large number of scholarly texts on foreign and security policy topics and is one of Germany's most experienced foreign policy experts.

Julian Junk is a member of the working group »International Organizations« and the Cluster of Excellence »Normative Orders« since April 2010. As a research fellow he is working in the research projects »Transformation of Security Culture« and »Rule and Resistance in Global Politics«. From 2006 to 2010, he was a research fellow at the University of Konstanz at the Department of Public Administration and Management and in the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) »Norm and Symbol«. He implemented the SFB research project »Casualties of the New World Order: the Political Construction of Success and Failure of International Administrations«. He is currently co-leader of the research projects »Administrative Science Meets Peacekeeping« and »Coping with the complex side of bureaucracy: Taking a closer look at the internal dynamics of United Nations peace operations« both funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research.

Born in Berlin in 1958, **Dr. Wolfgang Manig** studied law in Erlangen, Lausanne and Munich. He has been in the Foreign Service since 1987. He has worked in the former Europe Department as well as the Political, Legal and Economic Departments. He has been head of the African Department for Basic Principles/Southern Africa/Great Lakes since 2008.

He has been assigned to the German embassies in Pakistan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General in Brussels. His publications include articles on the EURATOM Treaty and various security-policy topics.

Brig. General Joel George Martins is the Executive Director, Pax Africa, with Pax Africa as a leading expert working on APSA and SSG.

Roger Middleton is a Consultant Researcher with the Africa Programme at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs – London). He specializes in the politics of the Horn of Africa and in Africa – EU relations, and has written extensively about the problem of piracy from Somalia, the peace process in Sudan and the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Mr. Middleton is regularly asked to provide analysis in the media, and has appeared on BBC Newsnight and the Today programme, as well as contributed to the Financial Times, The Independent and others. He has given evidence to the House of Lords and the European Parliament.

Dr. Norman Mlambo is currently the Security Sector Reform Focal Point for the African Union Commission. Before joining the AU, Dr. Mlambo worked as Head of Peace and Security Research at the Africa Institute of South Africa. Previously, he also worked as a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and as a pilot with the Air Force of Zimbabwe. Dr. Mlambo has written and published numerous works on African peace, security and development.

Kidist Mulugeta Kebede is currently serving as a research consultant at the Governance Section of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. She has produced papers on security issues of the Horn of Africa including piracy, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and the Somali conflict.

Dr. Admore Mupoki Kambudzi is the current Secretary of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Born in Zimbabwe, and prior to taking up the current assignment, he was a UN Office for Project Services Consultant attached to the OAU/AU. In that assignment, Dr. Kambudzi supported the review process of the OAU/AU on continental mechanisms on peace and security. Earlier on, Dr. Kambudzi lectured in political science at the University of Zimbabwe from 1992 to 2001. He holds a PhD in Political Science (International Relations).

Dr. Rolf Mützenich is the foreign policy spokesperson for the SPD Parliamentary Party Group in the German Bundestag and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. Mützenich has been working for the SPD politically since as far back as 1979. He began working as a research staff member in the Bundestag, after which he entered regional politics in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991, working there as department head in the North Rhine-Westphalian government and the SPD Landtag Parliamentary Party Group. Dr. Mützenich became an elected member of the German Bundestag in 2002, where he concentrated on foreign policy issues and served as disarmament policy spokesperson of the Parliamentary Party Group from 2004 to 2009. He has been the foreign policy spokesperson of the Parliamentary Party Group since 2009.

Dr. Wullson Mvomo Ela teaches at the Institute for International Relations at the University of Yaoundé in Cameroon, devoting his attention to scholarly work as well as education in security policy issues and the role of security forces. He is Commissioner for Studies on the Cabinet of the General Delegation for National Security and serves as expert of the Cameroon Government at various meetings of the AU and UN. He has published works on security-policy issues in Central Africa and on Cameroon's security forces.

Marina Peter has been working for peace and understanding in the Sudan for 25 years. She received the Federal Cross of Merit in 2008 for her work on the Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF). The Evangelical Development Service is a co-founder of the SEF and together with Christian aid organi-

sations such as »Brot für die Welt«, Misereor and Caritas funds the forum's work. Marina Peter has also been the chairperson of Sudan Forum e. V., which she helped establish, since 1990.

Peter Schumann has been Senior Fellow at the Excellence Cluster at the University of Constance since 2007. Before this he worked abroad for more than 35 years, 25 of them with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). He was also involved for lengthy periods in UN peacekeeping missions such as, for example, in the Sudan, Kosovo, Tajikistan, Somalia, Iraq and Liberia. The focal points of his work with the UNDP were development-policy questions, especially in countries marked by latent or open internal armed conflicts.

A citizen of the Benin Republic, **Dr. Gilles Olakounlé Yabi** holds a Doctorate in Development Economics from the University of Clermont-Ferrand and a master's degree in International Economics from the University of Paris I Sorbonne. Gilles worked as a journalist for Jeune Afrique, a weekly magazine edited in Paris specialising on African political and economic affairs.

From 2004 to 2008 Gilles was political analyst with Crisis Group's West Africa Project based in Dakar, Senegal. He then worked as an independent researcher and consultant in the fields of conflict analysis, peacekeeping operations and political governance in West Africa. He has worked on several research studies on conflict and instability in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sahel region. His consultancy assignments included a research project on UN peacekeeping operations in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone with the Madrid-based think-tank FRIDE and an assessment of the strategy of the Open Society Initiative in West Africa (OSIWA). He did a study on the management of political crises in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau by the West African regional organisation ECOWAS with FES.

Since January 2011 Gilles Yabi has returned to the International Crisis Group as the West Africa Project Director, based in Dakar, Senegal.

List of Publications for Further Reading

An anthology of peace and security research, Institute for Peace and Security Studies (2010)

Die EU und Afrika – Potentiale für entwicklungspolitische Friedensarbeit, Marc Baxmann (9/2010)

Afrika als kernwaffenfreie Zone: nach dreizehn Jahren tritt der "Vertrag von Pelindaba" in Kraft, Thomas Mättig (2009)

The African Union and security sector reform: a review of the post-conflict reconstruction & development (PCRD) policy, Medhane Tadesse (2010)

East Africa

The role of regional and international organizations in resolving the Somali conflict: the case of IGAD, Kidist Mulugeta (2010)

Sudan und Somalia – Weichensteller am Horn von Afrika, Annette Weber; Anja Dargatz (2010)
English version: **Sudan and Somalia: linchpins on the Horn of Africa**

West Africa

Nach der Regierungsbildung in Guinea: neue Hoffnung für die Demokratie?, Jens-Uwe Hettmann (2010)

Nach dem Massaker von Conakry: Herrschaft der Kriegerkaste oder nachholende Demokratisierung?, Jens-Uwe Hettmann (2009)

Rôle des Forces de Sécurité dans le processus électoral: cas de six pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, Mathias Hounkpe; Alioune Badara Gueye (2010)
English version: **The role of security forces in the electoral process: the case of six West African countries**

Guinea-Bissau und die Konfliktregion an der Westspitze Afrikas: politischer Stillstand und risikoreiche internationale Verwicklungen, Friedrich Kramme-Sternmose; Pascal Sambou (2009)

Religiöser Konflikt und politisches Versagen in Nigeria, Thomas Mättig (2010)

ECOWAS auf dem Prüfstand: Stärken und Grenzen regionaler Sicherheitspolitik in Westafrika, Sebastian Sperling (2011)
English version: **ECOWAS in crisis mode: strengths and limits of regional security policy in West Africa**

Staatsfeinde Nummer eins?: Organisierte Kriminalität gewinnt Einfluss in Westafrika, Sebastian Sperling (2010)

Le rôle de la CEDEAO dans la gestion des crises politiques et des conflits: cas de la Guinée et de la Guinée Bissau, Gilles Olakounlé Yabi (2010)
English version: **The role of ECOWAS in managing political crisis and conflict: the cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau**

Southern Africa

The role of SADC in managing political crisis and conflict: the cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe, Gavin Cawthra (2010)

Security and democracy in Southern Africa, ed. by Gavin Cawthra (2007)

Auf der Suche nach Kontrolle: die politische Krise in Madagaskar 2009/2010, Constantin Grund (2010)

The publications can be downloaded from the digital library of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:
http://library.fes.de/inhalt/digital/fes-publikation.htm.

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